Event-based prospective memory (PM) tasks require participants to substitute an atypical PM response for an ongoing task response when presented with PM targets. Responses to ongoing tasks are often slower with the addition of PM demands ("PM costs"). Prominent PM theories attribute costs to capacity-sharing between the ongoing and PM tasks, which reduces the rate of processing of the ongoing task. We modeled PM costs using the Linear Ballistic Accumulator and the Diffusion Decision Model in a lexical-decision task with nonfocal PM targets defined by semantic categories. Previous decision modeling, which attributed costs to changes in caution rather than rate of processing (Heathcote et al., 2015; Horn & Bayen, 2015) , could be criticized on the grounds that the PM tasks included did not sufficiently promote capacity-sharing. Our semantic PM task was potentially more dependent on lexical decision resources than previous tasks ), yet costs were again driven by changes in threshold and not by changes in processing speed (drift rate). Costs resulting from a single target focal PM task were also driven by threshold changes. The increased thresholds underlying nonfocal and focal costs were larger for word trials than nonword trials. As PM targets were always words, this suggests that threshold increases are used to extend the time available for retrieval on PM trials. Under nonfocal conditions, but not focal conditions, the nonword threshold also increased. Thus, it seems that only nonfocal instructions cause a global threshold increase because of greater perceived task complexity.
In our everyday lives we often need to remember to perform an intended action when we next encounter an environmental cue (e.g., pass on a message to a coworker), a requirement referred to as event-based prospective memory (PM). Event-based PM has traditionally been examined in the laboratory using the Einstein and McDaniel (1990) paradigm, where participants perform an ongoing task (e.g., a lexical-decision task), and try to remember to make an alternative (PM) response when a target event is presented in the ongoing task (e.g., when a letter string contains a certain syllable). In these paradigms target trials, on which the stimulus is a PM target and the PM response is required, are relatively infrequent and interspersed among nontarget trials, on which the stimulus is not a PM target and an ongoing task response is required.
Average response times (RTs) to nontarget trials are often longer in blocks where participants have a PM task, versus control blocks with no PM task (Smith, 2003) . This slowing is referred to as the PM cost. Costs are common for tasks in which making ongoing task decisions does not require processing information about the stimuli relevant to the PM task, referred to as nonfocal PM tasks . For example, detecting target members of a semantic category (e.g., animal) is nonfocal to ongoing lexical decision making, because deciding whether a letter string is present in the mental lexicon does not require knowledge of the semantic categories to which the word belongs. An example of a focal PM task is to respond to a specific PM target word if presented during a lexical-decision task , because in this case the identity of the target word is part of the analysis required for the ongoing task. Focal PM costs are not always found and when they are present they are smaller than nonfocal PM costs .
Several theories of PM, such as the Preparatory Attentional and Memory Processes (PAM) theory (Smith, 2010) , and the Multiprocess view , assume that PM costs occur because a proportion of an individual's available capacity is allocated away from the ongoing task and toward the PM task. We refer to these as capacity-sharing theories of PM costs to emphasize that the costs result from the division of capacity between the two tasks during stimulus processing. The empirical basis of capacity-sharing theories is slowing of mean correct RTs as a function of imposed PM task demands. The problem with this approach is that analyzing mean RTs alone omits crucial information contained in the shape of the RT distributions and in error rates, which can indicate whether participants are trading speed for accuracy. This is compounded by the fact that most PM studies report near-ceiling ongoing task accuracy, where a significant change in speed could easily trade for a nonsignificant change in accuracy. This makes it impossible to unambiguously attribute elevated RTs for the ongoing task in the PM condition to capacitysharing. Elevated RTs could equally result from changes in other aspects of the decision process, such as the amount of evidence required to trigger a response.
Indeed, Loft and Remington (2013) proposed an alternative to capacity-sharing theories that predicts PM costs can result from increased response thresholds. Heathcote, Loft, and Remington (2015) subsequently referred to this idea as delay theory. Loft and Remington noted that in the Einstein and McDaniel (1990) paradigm, not only must the participant remember a new episodic PM task, but this less frequent PM task must compete for response selection with the more routine ongoing task. They reasoned that PM errors should be reduced if participants are provided with more processing time for the less frequent PM response to emerge. To test this, Loft and Remington asked participants to withhold their responses until a tone played. The tones played at varying delays after stimulus presentation. PM accuracy was improved by delays as brief as 0.2 s. Heathcote et al. proposed that individuals endogenously implement something akin to this response-delay manipulation by raising their threshold to make ongoing task responses, producing PM costs. This functional slowing could result either from a conscious strategy change, or an unconscious adaption, based on task experience.
Comparing Capacity-Sharing and Delay Theories
Distinguishing delay theory from capacity-sharing theories requires a method of separating changes in processing speed from response threshold increases. Such a separation is intrinsic to evidence accumulation models of the decision process, which assume that evidence accumulates at an estimated rate (the drift rate) until it exceeds a certain amount (the response threshold), at which time a task response is made (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) . Capacity-sharing theories assume that PM tasks absorb capacity that could otherwise be used to speed up and/or improve the accuracy of ongoing task responses (e.g., Smith, 2010) . Mapping the capacity demands of one task (e.g., PM) to increased mean RT on another concurrent task (e.g., ongoing) is most consistent with the conceptualisation of capacity as the amount of work the cognitive system is able to perform per unit of time (Wenger & Townsend, 2000) , which we refer to as functional capacity. For example, the PAM theory explicitly attributes PM costs to shared attentional resources that are functional to PM retrieval (Smith & Bayen, 2004) . Theories of attention, almost universally, equate resource allocation with processing speed, regardless of whether the models posit a continuous division of resource capacity between two tasks, or a single-channel, all-or-none allocation. In resource accounts (Bundesen, 1990; Gobell, Tseng, & Sperling, 2004; Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1980) attentional capacity is a processing rate multiplier. Evidence accrues in parallel for each of a set of multiple concurrent tasks at a rate directly proportional to the amount of capacity allocated to that task. In contrast, single-channel bottleneck theories treat resource sharing as iterative sampling, whereby a single resource is allocated in rapid succession between a set of current tasks (Pashler, 1984; Welford, 1952) . The rate of evidence accumulation for a given task (or channel) is determined by the frequency with which attention is allocated to it. In either case, sensory signals, decisions, and response selection are speeded in direct proportion to the attentional resources they receive. Thus, functional capacity-sharing between the PM task and the ongoing task would be reflected in decreased evidence accumulation to the ongoing task.
Drift rates agree with other measures of functional capacity, such as the nonparametric cognitive capacity coefficient provided by Systems Factorial Technology (Eidels, Donkin, Brown, & Heathcote, 2010) . The capacity coefficient compares performance to a benchmark unlimited-capacity independent parallel model in specially designed experimental paradigms, and classifies participants' task performance as either exhibiting supercapacity (more capacity when there are two information streams), unlimited capacity (no interference in processing between information streams), or limited capacity (interference in processing between information streams). Eidels et al. investigated capacity requirements using a redundant target paradigm, in which the total amount of work the system must perform is manipulated by presenting either single or double targets to participants. LBA drift rates and the capacity coefficient agreed in their attribution of individual differences in capacity among participants. Donkin et al. (2014) found that LBA rates agreed with Townsend and Altieri (2012)'s accuracy adjusted capacity coefficient estimates regarding which accuracy manipulations induced increases in threshold and rates, and which selectively induced changes in threshold. Logan et al. (2014) found that increasing the array of choice alternatives in a word identification task-and hence the demand on capacity because of the need to process each alternativereduced evidence accumulation rates. Sewell, Lilburn, and Smith (2016) varied visual load by presenting different numbers of concurrent Gabor patch stimuli. They found that manipulation of the set size of stimuli (visual load) altered drift rates. All of these results suggest that functional capacity is well measured by drift rates.
In contrast to capacity-sharing theories, delay theory attributes PM costs to the strategic slowing of ongoing task response selection to allow more time for the PM response to reach threshold. Consequently, it predicts that PM costs should be caused by changes in response criteria, reflected in the response threshold This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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parameters of evidence accumulation models. Thus, the delay theory and capacity-sharing theories of costs produce opposing predictions. A finding that PM demands significantly affect mean drift rates, with no significant change to threshold, provides strong evidence against delay theory. Capacity-sharing theories do not predict that costs are solely accounted for by response threshold, as this parameter reflects strategy rather than the speed of processing. A finding of threshold changes with no changes in mean drift rate provides strong evidence against capacity-sharing. Recently (Heathcote et al., 2015; Horn & Bayen, 2015) , two evidence accumulation models have been fit to PM costs: the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) and the Diffusion Decision Model (DDM). Heathcote et al. applied the LBA and DDM to three experiments that used lexical-decision ongoing tasks. The PM task was to respond to either letter strings of a specific color (nontargets were presented in multiple other colors), or to letter strings that contained a specific syllable (e.g., "tor"). Horn and Bayen (2015) reported DDM analyses of four experiments. Participants performed a lexical-decision ongoing task. The PM task was to make a PM response when items started with specific letters (e.g., G, H, or M). In both Heathcote et al. and Horn and Bayen, there was no evidence that holding a PM intention decreased average drift rates. Instead, there was strong evidence in all seven of the data sets that PM costs were caused by increased response thresholds. These results favor the delay theory of PM costs over capacity-sharing theories.
There is, however, an alternative view of cognitive capacity. It has been proposed that another type of capacity drives an overarching executive structure that controls otherwise modular processing systems (McVay & Kane, 2012; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010) . We refer to this as executive capacity. Under this view, the processing speed of any one system (e.g., the ongoing task) remains intact as long as the executive system is able to keep the process engaged. However, increased load (e.g., as a result of PM) will occasionally exceed the capacity of the executive system. The result is a total lapse of attention, during which processing of all tasks is halted or drastically slowed. If PM loads executive capacity, then processing speed during PM blocks would be the same as in control PM blocks on most nontarget trials, but would occasionally be much slower because of increased attentional lapses. Thus, PM demands would not be expected to have a strong effect on mean PM cost. Instead PM demands would primarily affect RT variability via longer RTs during PM-induced attentional lapses (Ihle, Ghisletta, & Kliegel, 2017) . Similarly, in terms of evidence accumulation parameters, executive capacity load should affect drift rate variability, rather than mean drift rate. This view was supported by McVay and Kane (2012) . They found that the extent to which working memory capacity predicted performance of a simple RT task was not strongly mediated by mean drift rate, but was mediated both by drift rate variability and subjective reports of attentional lapses. Further, Hawkins, Mittner, Forstmann, and Heathcote (2017) demonstrated that when simulated data is mixed from two DDMs, one with a drift rate of 1 (regular trials) and one with a drift rate of 0 (lapsed trials), a single DDM captured the mixed data by an increase in the drift rate variability parameter. In one of the previously modeled experiments, Heathcote et al. (2015) did find increased variability in drift rates with PM. However, the drift rate variability shift predicted very little of the PM costs. In addition, no such increase was found in any other experiments of either Heathcote et al. or Horn and Bayen. Thus, there is currently no strong evidence that PM costs are caused by the PM task loading executive capacity.
It has also been argued that capacity-sharing could increase the "nondecision time" parameters of evidence accumulation models (Horn & Bayen, 2015) . Nondecision time reflects the processes that occur in sequence with response selection, such as stimulus encoding and motor response production. Horn and Bayen proposed that increased nondecision time may reflect the slowing effect of capacity-sharing on encoding time, or it may reflect the time taken for sequential PM target check processes (i.e., a target check that occurs either before or after the ongoing task decision). However, encoding processes are often data limited, meaning their processing rate is determined largely by the quality of the input rather than the allocation of resources (Norman & Bobrow, 1975) . Further, sequential PM target checking, strictly speaking, is not an account that involves competition for cognitive capacity or resources between the ongoing task and detection of the PM cue. Rather, it interposes additional cognitive operations that occur outside of ongoing task response selection. These putative operations presumably are directed at identifying whether the stimulus is the PM cue. Waiting for these operations to complete could slow RTs whether or not the operations draw capacity from the ongoing task. Thus, to the extent that capacity-sharing theories of costs have considered PM costs as positive evidence for capacitysharing, they predict that PM resource demand slows ongoing task processing speed and not nondecision time. Both Horn and Bayen (2015) and Heathcote et al. (2015) found evidence that a portion of nonfocal PM costs were because of an increase in the nondecision time parameter. However, nondecision time accounted for a much smaller proportion of costs than threshold. In addition, Heathcote et al. reported increased nondecision time under PM conditions for the DDM, but not for the LBA. It was only in Heathcote et al. that both the DDM and LBA models were fit, and they found that the LBA produced better fits than the DDM, primarily through changes in threshold. This is consistent with simulation showing that the DDM mimics LBA threshold increases with increases in both threshold and nondecision time (Donkin, Brown, Heathcote, & Wagenmakers, 2011) .
Although existing PM costs modeling has clearly agreed on the critical role of increased thresholds, there are differences in the nature of the threshold increases that have been observed. Heathcote et al. (2015) found evidence in the data of Lourenço et al. (2013) that ongoing task thresholds increase in proportion to the response's competition with the PM response. Lourenço et al. had participants perform a lexical-decision task, and some participants were informed that the PM target syllable would only appear in word trials. As PM targets were always word trials, the word ongoing task response would be much more likely to preempt the PM response. There was a larger increase in threshold for word responses than for nonword responses. Heathcote et al. argued that this selective threshold increase is targeted strategically to increase the probability of PM responses on PM trials. In contrast to Heathcote et al., Horn and Bayen (2015) argued that threshold increases occur because the PM instructions make the task set appear more complex to participants. This view was supported by Horn and Bayen's fourth experiment, for which they reported an equal increase in word and nonword thresholds, despite participants being informed that PM items would always be words. The This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
task complexity view suggests a more general strategy adjustment, which may or may not be functional to PM.
The Current Study
It is possible that past failures to find decreased drift rates under PM conditions could be attributed to the nature of the nonfocal PM tasks examined, which have included detecting targets of a certain color, first letter, or containing a particular syllable. Although capacity-sharing theories have unequivocally attributed costs to capacity-sharing under these conditions on the basis of mean RT Smith, 2010) , there is no assurance that these represent the kinds of PM demands that would be most likely to drive capacity-sharing during stimulus processing. Capacity-sharing theories assume that information about two or more tasks could accrue and compete for resources under the same configuration of the cognitive system. PM cues defined by a unique color could lead to detection before much evidence accumulation on the lexical-decision task, consistent with the proposal that color identification occurs at an early stage of processing (Craik, 2002) . Initial letters or internal syllable strings might also not be the kinds of PM cues for which information would accumulate in parallel with the lexical evaluation. In terms of visual attention, lexical processing is optimized around the center of the stimulus (O'regan, Lévy-Schoen, Pynte, & Brugaillère, 1984; Yao-N=Dré, Castet, & Vitu, 2013) , whereas first letter detection is optimized at the beginning of the stimulus (Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton, & Lee, 2010) , and syllable detection might require a serial scan of the stimulus. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the previous lack of PM interference with evidence accumulation will generalize to other PM paradigms. Given the long-standing and widespread agreement that nonfocal costs are positive evidence of capacity-sharing (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; Smith, 2010) it is crucial to ascertain whether the previous lack of drift-rate-driven costs will generalize to other PM tasks in which there is a stronger a priori case for capacity-sharing.
With this in mind, in the current study our approach was to keep the ongoing task consistent with previous studies (lexical decision), but to extend modeling to the costs from the commonly used categorical nonfocal task (e.g., Dewitt, Hicks, Ball, & Knight, 2012; Loft & Humphreys, 2012; Loft & Remington, 2013; Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos, 2003; Marsh, Hicks, & Watson, 2002; Meeks, Hicks, & Marsh, 2007; Meeks & Marsh, 2010) , which requires detecting words belonging to target categories, for example remembering to make a PM response to any animal word. The categorical PM task requires prolonged accumulation of evidence about the meaning of the stimulus (unlike the color PM task), and the same visual analysis as lexical decision (unlike the first letter or the syllable task). As lexical and semantic processing are likely to occur in parallel, the PM costs induced by the task may be a result of capacity-sharing. This proposition is supported by Marsh et al. (2005) , who reported that categorical PM accuracy was reduced when participants were instructed to increase their lexical decision effort, but that PM accuracy was not affected for the more visual PM task of detecting palindromes. This evidence for more capacity-sharing between categorical PM and lexical decision was present despite there being a larger mean PM cost for the palindrome task. Thus, our categorical PM condition may be more conducive to mean drift rate decreases than the tasks previously modeled even if it produces smaller mean RT costs.
Similarly, the categorical PM task may be more conducive to changes in drift rate variability than the previously modeled tasks. This would map to attentional lapses induced by the PM task loading executive capacity. The categorical information required to detect PM is presumably obtained at later stage of processing than perceptual information, such as stimulus color. It is possible that conflicts at this later stage between the concurrent management of lexical and categorical processing may be particularly taxing for the executive system, leading to more lapses of attention and increased drift rate variability.
Our nonfocal PM targets were always words, and this feature of the PM task was highlighted in the PM instructions. This allowed us to compare the delay theory view of threshold shifts as strategic waiting for PM retrieval (Heathcote et al., 2015) , with the view of threshold shifts as a reaction to perceived task complexity (Horn & Bayen, 2015) . If the threshold shift is implemented to ensure that the PM response is retrieved on PM trials, then participants will become more biased against responding to a word under PM conditions (i.e., the word threshold will increase relative to the nonword threshold). In contrast, if the threshold shift is not implemented specifically to extend time on PM trials for PM retrieval, then threshold shifts may be equal for word and nonword responses.
We also modeled costs from a focal PM demand to make a PM response to a single target word. Focal PM costs can often reach statistical significance (Loft & Remington, 2013) , but they tend to be much smaller in magnitude than costs caused by nonfocal PM demands (Meeks & Marsh, 2010) . As with nonfocal costs, capacity-sharing theories of PM all propose that, when focal PM costs are observed, they occur because a proportion of an individual's available capacity (whether actually required for PM retrieval or not) is allocated away from the ongoing task and toward the PM task (McDaniel, Umanath, Einstein, & Waldum, 2015; Smith, Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 2007) . Delay theory can account for focal PM costs without capacity-sharing. If thresholds can account for the majority of the larger nonfocal PM costs-where the PM retrieval is presumably more likely to interfere with evidence accumulation-and not account for the majority of the smaller focal PM costs-where the PM interference with evidence accumulation should be minimal-that would be inconsistent with delay theory, and would bring into question conclusions drawn from the nonfocal modeling.
In addition, comparison of the focal and nonfocal conditions, where two identical PM response modes are used, can reveal the effects of increasing the actual and perceived demands of PM target detection. For example, if participants are sensitive to the fact that focal PM can be supported by lexical decision processing, the focal PM task may not induce the same level of increased perceived task complexity as the nonfocal PM task. If this is the case, a global threshold shift would be less likely in the focal than in the nonfocal condition. Horn and Bayen (2015) 's modeling went against this proposition, as they found that focal PM costs were accounted for with a global increase in DDM thresholds. However, their focal PM task required subjects to make a PM response to any one of three PM target words. Our focal PM task required participants to remember to make a response to one single target word, a manipulation more in line with the focal PM demand traditionally imposed by researchers when using lexical decision tasks (see Einstein & McDaniel, 2010) . In contrast to a one-item PM target This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
list, which individuals can likely easily hold in focal attention, a memory retrieval operation may well be required to access the multiple-target list to compare it against each presented letter string (Loft, Humphreys, & Whitney, 2008; Öztekin, Davachi, & McElree, 2010) . It is, therefore, possible that the retrospective memory requirement in the Horn and Bayen study increased perceived task complexity, resulting in the global threshold change. The current study also permits us to examine the reproducibility and generality of nondecision time effects. As noted by Horn and Bayen (2015) , the degree of target checking may depend on task demands. The tasks that have produced nondecision time effects were a first letter task, in which the target letter was guaranteed to be presented in a specific visual location (the start of a word), and a syllable detection task. Both may require a visual analysis separate from the lexical decision, and thus arguably would encourage nondecision time effects. In the current PM task, where parallel accumulation between PM and ongoing responses is more plausible, nondecision effects should be less likely. Nondecision effects have to date only been found in DDM, which has provided a worse fit than the LBA to PM costs data, suggesting they may be a result of model mimicry. Thus, if we do find increased nondecision time, it will be crucial to determine whether the result is obtained from the best fitting model architecture.
Method Participants
Thirty-five participants were tested (21 women), with ages ranging from 17-79 1 (M ϭ 25.77). Participants performed three 1-hr sessions on separate days. English as a first language was required to participate. Participants received either $45 AUD or credit toward their first year psychology unit. The study was approved by the University of Western Australia's Human Research Ethics Office.
Materials
There were 2,188 low frequency (occurring 2-6 times per million) English words (of length between 4 and 10 characters) that were selected from the Sydney Morning Herald word database (Dennis, 1995) , plus 62 extra words from the MRC 2.00 database (Wilson, 1988 ) for a total of 2,250 words. A nonword was created from each word by replacing every vowel with a random alternate vowel (e.g., chemist to chamust). In addition, 34 low frequency words from each of three categories (animal, food, and human body part) were selected to be PM targets.
Participants performed 9 blocks of 500 trials: 3 nonfocal, 3 focal, and 3 control blocks. Participants performed 1 block of each type on each day. Block order was balanced across days so that participants would not get a condition in the same position twice. For example, if on Day 1 a participant had the order focal/ nonfocal/control then focal would not be presented first, nonfocal not presented second and control not presented third on Day 2 or 3. There are 12 day orders that satisfy these conditions (e.g., Day 1 -focal/nonfocal/control, Day 2 -nonfocal/control/focal, Day 3 -control/focal/nonfocal), and these orders were approximately counterbalanced over the final 35 participants.
Under nonfocal conditions, participants were presented with 250 nonwords, 217 nontarget words, and 33 target words from one of the target categories (e.g., 33 different animal words). Under control conditions, participants were presented with 250 nonwords and 250 words. Under focal conditions, participants were presented with 250 nonwords, 217 nontarget words, and 1 target word (e.g., "giraffe") was presented 33 times. Each target category was in one nonfocal block for each participant. For each participant, one focal target word was drawn randomly from each of the target categories (without replacement; each word was only used as a focal target for one participant), and if a word was to be presented as a target in the focal block then it was not presented in the nonfocal blocks for that participant. The assignment of target category to each day's nonfocal block, and of which target category the word from the focal block was drawn, was random (without replacement) except that the focal word for a given day was never from the nonfocal PM category for that day. The order of nontarget stimuli was randomized. Under PM conditions, one target was presented in a random position once every 15 trials, starting from Trials 6 -20. Thus, 33 trials of the 500 trials in each block were PM targets. Target trials were separated by at least 2 nontargets. To balance against any general effect of word repetition in the focal condition, one word in the control condition was repeated 33 times according to PM target position rules for approximately half the participants. The order of the PM stimuli assigned to the PM target positions in the nonfocal blocks was random.
Procedure
For the lexical-decision task, participants were instructed that they would be presented with letter strings and to press a key to indicate whether strings were words or nonwords as quickly and as accurately as possible (the assignment of the keys 'f' and 'j' to word and nonword responses was approximately counterbalanced). Under PM conditions, participants were also instructed to press the '9' key instead of the word response when they were presented targets (a specific target word for focal PM, or a member of a specific category for nonfocal PM). Under control conditions, participants were instructed that they only needed to make lexical decision responses for that block. Each trial began with a fixation cross 'ϩ', displayed in white on a black background for 0.5 s. The fixation cross was then replaced by a blank screen for 0.25 s, which was followed by a white letter string that remained on the black screen until the participant responded. Each day, participants first completed 20 practice lexical decision trials. Participants were then presented with either the focal, nonfocal or control instructions. Participants then completed a 3-min distractor puzzle, after which they began their first block of trials. In between blocks participants rested for 2 min. After each block had been completed, participants were instructed to disregard the instructions from the previous block.
1 In response to a reviewer who noted our wide age range, we reran all analyses in the article with participants older than 40 (of which there were 6) excluded. The patterns of significance in the conventional results were almost identical, as were the models selected and the patterns of significance in the parameter ANOVAs. The inclusion versus exclusion of these participants did not influence the interpretation of the results. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Results
In addition to stimulus type (word, nonword) and condition (focal, nonfocal, and control) the analyses included a day factor (Day 1, Day 2, and Day 3) to capture the potential effects of task repetition. The first two trials of each block were excluded, as were trials where RTs were very fast (Ͻ0.2 s) or very slow (Ͼ mean RT plus 3 times the interquartile range/1.349, which is a robust equivalent to a mean 3 SD cutoff). This resulted in the exclusion of 6.34% of nontarget trials and 4.16% of PM trials. One of the 35 participants was excluded from all analyses because they completely neglected nonword responding under PM conditions (no nonword responses over 3,000 trials). We also excluded a total of eight blocks (that came from four participants) because accuracy was near chance (Ͻ60%), suggesting a guessing strategy. Another block (from one of the same four participants) was excluded because the participant made a PM response to 20/32 repeats of a stimulus in a control block, suggesting they mistakenly deduced that it was a focal PM block. The exclusion of these 9 blocks of trials resulted in the removal of 2.2% of the remaining data.
We had to exclude the four participants with missing blocks from LBA and DDM fitting, which require a balanced data structure. Overall then, the LBA and DDM was fit to 30 participants out of the 35 participants tested, resulting in a 14% participant exclusion rate. This exclusion rate is higher than typical, and likely driven by the unusually large number of trials participants had to complete over 3 days of testing. The supplementary materials contain conventional analysis of the 30 participant data set to which we fit the DDM and LBA, which produces a similar pattern of results to analysis of the full data set.
In text we report the results of analysis on the full data set (N ϭ 34), which we achieved by using random-effects models that are robust to the presence of missing cells in the data structure. Response accuracies (both PM error rates and lexical decision error rates) were analyzed using a generalized linear model with a binomial probit link function. For PM analysis, the dependent variable for the probit model was the presence versus absence of a PM response on each PM trial. For the ongoing task analysis, the dependent variable for the probit model was lexical decision accuracy. We analyzed RTs using a general linear model with the dependent variable mean correct RT. The random-effects model results are tabulated in the supplementary materials, and the pattern of significant effects are reported in the body of the text below. Within-subject standard errors, both in text and in the graphs, were calculated using the Morey (2008) bias corrected method.
Prospective Memory Task
PM responses were scored as correct if the participant pressed the PM response key instead of a lexical decision response key on the target trial. PM accuracy was higher in the focal condition (M ϭ 80%, SE ϭ 3%), than the nonfocal condition (M ϭ 58%, SE ϭ 3%), and decreased over days (Day 1 M ϭ 77%, SE ϭ 3%; Day 2 M ϭ 70%, SE ϭ 3%; Day 3 M ϭ 60%, SE ϭ 4%). Correct PM responses were faster in the focal condition (M ϭ 0.795 s, SE ϭ 0.021 s) than the nonfocal condition (M ϭ 0.916 s, SE ϭ 0.024 s). The PM false alarm rate was 0.17% (ranging from 0 to 0.5% across participants).
Lexical Decision Task
PM target trials, false alarms and the two lexical decision trials following each target trial or false alarm were excluded. Trials in which participants were presented repeated nontargets in the control condition and the two trials following were also excluded. Lexical decision accuracy was higher for nonwords (93.3%) than for words (91.7%), and decreased over days (Day 1 M ϭ 93.9%, SE ϭ 0.9%; Day 2 M ϭ 92.2%, SE ϭ 1.1%; Day 3 M ϭ 91.3%, SE ϭ 1.1%). There was an interaction between PM condition and stimulus type (see Figure 1 ). Planned comparisons suggested there was not a difference between nonfocal nonword accuracy (93.4%) compared with control nonword accuracy (92.5%), t(33) ϭ 1.46, p ϭ .15, but there was a difference for focal nonword accuracy This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
.01, d ϭ 0.56. Nonword RTs were not significantly different between nonfocal blocks (0.662 s) and control blocks (0.654 s), t(33) ϭ 1.14, p ϭ .26, or between focal blocks (0.649 s) and control blocks, t Ͻ 1.
LBA Analysis
The LBA provided a substantially better account of the data than the DDM, both in terms of the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) selected models. In fact, even a very simple LBA-one that accounts for all the effects of practice and PM condition in threshold (see Table 1 , 16 parameters per participant)-had a lower deviance than the top DDM model (48 parameters per participant). Qualitatively, the DDM consistently underpredicted error rates to word stimuli, even for the most flexible DDM. Thus, we focus on inference from the LBA fits. The details of the DDM analysis can be found in supplementary materials, and the implications of the DDM analysis are addressed in the discussion section.
The LBA proposes that evidence accumulates separately for each response over time, and the response made is the first to accrue evidence that reaches its threshold (see Figure 2) . Each accumulator begins a decision trial with a starting amount of evidence drawn from the uniform distribution [0, A] . Evidence increases at a speed given by the drift rate, which is drawn from a normal distribution with mean v and SD sv, until it reaches a threshold b. The first accumulator to reach the threshold decides the response, and the time taken to make the response is decided by the time taken to reach the threshold plus a nondecision time constant t0. The drift rate parameters v and sv reflect processing efficiency and capacity, as well as stimulus features, with higher rates indicating more efficient processing of response-relevant stimulus features. Better task performance (increased speed and accuracy) can be achieved with high drift rates toward the correct response and lower drift rates toward the error response. Threshold reflects the caution to make a response, with a higher threshold corresponding to a shift in bias against making a response, which is expressed by decreased response frequency and slower responses. Threshold increases for all responses yields increases in both RTs and accuracy. We report threshold in terms of B (B ϭ b -A). Nondecision time (t0) reflects the time taken for processes such as the encoding of stimulus and response production, and thus nondecision time increases will increase RTs with no effects on response frequency.
In addition to the day factor, the PM condition factor, and the stimulus type factor reported in our conventional analyses, the LBA results described below include a response factor and correspondence factor. The response factor allows parameters to vary by the specific accumulator (e.g., participants may be biased against word responding, with a higher B for the word accumulator), and thus, can be either "word" or "nonword." The correspondence factor varies as a function of whether the response accumulator is "correct" for a stimulus (e.g., to capture better than chance accuracy, v is higher for correct responses than incorrect responses). We sequentially fit different parameterizations of the LBA as described in , building to a most complex "top" model, that we allowed to be highly flexible but included some reasonable restrictions for the sake of reducing computational effort. As B is assumed to be set before onset of the stimulus, in the LBA top model it is fixed over stimulus type but can vary over the response factor. To test the delay theory, B was also free to vary over condition, and to capture practice effects it was free to vary over days. Following previous applications of the LBA, including Heathcote et al. (2015) , we only estimated one value for start point noise parameter A (i.e., it did not vary over condition, day, or response).
To test capacity-sharing theories, the top model allowed the mean drift rate parameter v to vary over stimulus type, condition, day, and correspondence. The sv parameter could vary over the correspondence factor (correct vs. incorrect response). It could also vary across PM conditions, to test for PM-induced attention lapses (i.e., PM load on executive capacity). The sv for the false accumulator in the control condition was fixed at 1, as a scaling parameter. The sv parameter was fixed over the day factor. Nondecision time t0 was free to vary over condition, stimulus and day, but fixed between responses, as is conventional when fitting the LBA. With this top model, our sequential model fitting resulted in 11,265 model fits per subject, for a total of 337,950 fits.
Model parameter values were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (Myung, 2003) . The summed log likelihood of all trials was maximized. The deviance, our measure of quality of fit, is equal to two times the negative maximized log likelihood. Table  1 shows our model selection results. For model selection we used the AIC and BIC criteria (Myung & Pitt, 1997) , which attempt to select models that provide a good trade-off between minimizing the number of parameters (p) and minimizing the deviance.
2 AIC was calculated for each individual subject by applying the penalty term 2p to the deviance. The Group AIC was calculated by summing together the Participant AICs. The Group BIC was calculated by summing the deviances across participants, then applying the penalty term P ϫ log(N) to the summed deviance This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
(where N and P are the total number of observations and parameters summed over participants). The AIC selected model retained full flexibility for B, but dropped the PM condition factor for both v and sv, and dropped both the PM condition and stimulus factors for t0. The BIC selected model dropped the response factor for B, and both the condition and day factors for v and t0. In contrast to the AIC model, the stimulus factor was retained for t0. The AIC model did not fit significantly worse than the top model, 
AIC LBA Parameter Analysis
For estimates of B (see Figure 4) , a response by PM condition by day analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated a main effect of response, F(1, 29) ϭ 4.62, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .14, with higher B for word responding (1.076) than nonword responding (1.034). This suggests a bias against responding "word." There was also a main effect of PM condition, F(2, 58) ϭ 34.39, ε ϭ .87, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .54 (control B ϭ 1.018, focal B ϭ 1.047, nonfocal B ϭ 1.101), and B decreased over days (Day 1 ϭ 1.174, Day 2 ϭ 1.020, Day 3 ϭ 0.972), F(2, 58) ϭ 17.32, ε ϭ .96, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .37. The effect of response interacted with condition, F(2, 58) ϭ 29.62, ε ϭ .85, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .51. Planned contrasts revealed differences in B estimates for the word accumulator under focal conditions (1.069) compared with control conditions (1.020), t(29) ϭ 4.79, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 0.87, but not for the nonword accumulator (focal B ϭ 1.025, control B ϭ 1.016), t Ͻ 1. In the nonfocal condition, estimates of B were higher than control for both words (1.140), t(29) ϭ 8.60, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 1.57, and nonwords (1.062), t(29) ϭ 3.77, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 0.69. The increase in B under nonfocal conditions compared with control was larger for words than for nonwords, t(29) ϭ 6.59, p Ͻ .001, d ϭ 1.20. These contrasts suggest a selective threshold effect in both PM conditions; that is, bias against responding word increased compared with control. The selective threshold effect was larger in the nonfocal condition; that is, the shift in bias against responding word (as compared with control) was significantly higher under nonfocal conditions than under focal conditions, t(29) ϭ 3.50, p Ͻ .01, d ϭ 0.64. There was also an interaction between response type and day, F(2, 58) ϭ 9.25, ε ϭ .83, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .24, with B decreasing more over days for nonwords than for words (Day l nonword M ϭ 1.17, SE ϭ 0.032; Day 1 word M ϭ 1.181, SE ϭ 0.031; Day 2 nonword M ϭ 0.995, SE ϭ 0.027; Day 2 word M ϭ 1.045, SE ϭ 0.031; Day 3 nonword M ϭ 0.940, SE ϭ 0.026; Day 3 word M ϭ 1.003, SE ϭ 0.024). This is consistent with participants learning that they can lower their nonword threshold without increasing PM errors (i.e., learning over days to be increasingly biased against word responding). However, there was no 3-way interaction between this effect and PM condition, F(4, 116) ϭ 1.59, p ϭ .18. There was also no interaction between day and condition (F Ͻ 1).
The model selection indicated no effect of PM condition on either mean drift rate, v, or variability in drift rates, sv. For v, a stimulus type by day by correspondence ANOVA indicated a main effect of stimulus type, F(1, 29) ϭ 6.56, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .18, with word rates (M ϭ 0.806, SE ϭ 0.344) higher than nonword rates (M ϭ 0.741, SE ϭ 0.351). As expected with better than chance accuracy, there was an effect of correspondence, F(1, 29) ϭ 182.79, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .86, with correct rates (M ϭ 2.010, SE ϭ 0.130) higher than error rates (Ϫ0.463, SE ϭ 0.140). For sv, there was a significant effect of correspondence, with variability in rates lower for correct responses (M ϭ 0.445, SE ϭ 0.018) than for incorrect responses (that were fixed at 1), F(1, 29) ϭ 481.55, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .94. The model selection indicated no effect of PM demands, or stimulus type, affecting nondecision time, t0. There was an effect of day, F(2, 58) ϭ 3.60, ε ϭ .97, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .11, with t0 increasing on later days (Day 1 M ϭ 0.069, SE ϭ 0.007; Day 2 M ϭ 0.087, SE ϭ 0.006; Day 3 M ϭ 0.092, SE ϭ 0.006).
To assess the individual differences in our observed effects, we plotted the top model parameters that can directly contribute to the magnitude of PM costs (nondecision time, mean drift rate, variability in drift rate and response threshold) on a per-subject basis (see supplementary materials). Corroborating our model selection, there was a remarkably consistent picture of null mean drift rate effects, with minimal nondecision time and drift rate variability effects. In contrast, PM threshold effects were common, particularly for the word threshold. For example, for a little less than half the participants the nonfocal threshold increases were visibly larger for word thresholds than for nonword thresholds, whereas for no participants were the nonword threshold increases appreciably larger than word threshold increases.
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to investigate the latent variables that underlie costs induced by categorical nonfocal PM task demands and by focal PM task demands. Costs were observed under nonfocal conditions (mean RTs were 0.04 s This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
larger than control), and were present but smaller under focal PM conditions compared with control conditions (0.01 s). Costs were larger for correct word responses (nonfocal ϭ 0.058 s, focal ϭ 0.024 s), which were the greatest competitor with the PM response, than for correct nonword responses (nonfocal ϭ 0.022 s, focal ϭ Ϫ0.002 s). The modeling results extend Heathcote et al. (2015) and Horn and Bayen (2015) by unambiguously finding no effect of PM conditions on mean drift rates. This applied for both our single target focal task and our categorical nonfocal task. To date then, there has been a failure to find drift rate driven PM costs in the modeling of eight data sets, which used four conceptually different nonfocal PM tasks, and two focal PM tasks. Given the accruing consistency of the null mean drift rate effects, arguments for capacity-sharing would need to disavow any link between mean drift rates and capacity. However, this goes against the almost universally accepted link between processing speed and capacity in theories of attention (Bundesen, 1990; Gobell, Tseng, & Sperling, 2004; Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1980) , as well as empirical evidence supporting that link (Donkin et al., 2014; Eidels et al., 2010; Sewell et al., 2016) . Moreover, if the effects of capacity-sharing were somehow split between threshold changes and drift rate, then it is likely at least one of the eight modeled studies would have found some evidence for a mean drift rate effect, but none have. It is not clear what other parameters the claims of the capacity-sharing theories could correspond to. They certainly do not predict that costs would be entirely threshold-driven, as this parameter reflects response strategy and preference rather than resource allocation. Although nondecision time could be extended by a capacity demanding process, a nondecision time prediction is inconsistent with the proposal that costs are positive evidence for capacity-sharing, as there is no way to identify whether the processes which extend nondecision time are capacity consuming or not. Thus, the modeling evidence to date strongly ties PM costs in ongoing task RTs to increases in response thresholds underlying more cautious responding, and fails to provide any support for capacity-sharing during processing.
There are two points worth noting about what the null drift rate finding does not imply. First, the current findings do not rule out the existence of PM tasks that do require capacity sharing between ongoing tasks and PM tasks. The costs effects have only been modeled in paradigms in which the information required for PM retrieval is simple and available in the same general spatial location as the information required for ongoing task decisions. The previously modeled tasks include the canonical laboratory demonstrations of PM capacity sharing, but it may be that capacity sharing only occurs when there is a need to sample spatially separated information sources. One example would be an air traffic control task in which the PM task requires responding to an aircraft "callsign" property that has no relevance to aircraft conflict detection, and is in a completely separate visual location from the conflict detection information, where it would be unlikely to be processed at all without the PM requirement (Loft, 2014) . It seems likely in this case that switching attention between the stimuli for the two distinct tasks could affect the rate of evidence accumulation for the ongoing conflict detection task.
The second point is that the current findings do not imply that the PM task requires no cognitive capacity at all. Our model is limited to explaining PM costs, and hence can only provide insight into PM processes to the extent that changes in ongoing task response decision processes in response to PM task demands can be mapped to PM response decision processes. PM task may require cognitive capacity that is not shared with the ongoing task. Testing this would require a model that includes a process account of the PM task decision. The PM process could, for example, be modeled in an LBA computational architecture as a third, additional, evidence accumulator, that occurs in parallel with the two ongoing task accumulators.
The null effect on ongoing task drift rates extended not just to mean drift rates, but also to drift rate variability. Thus, there was This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
a lack of evidence for PM induced attentional lapses. To date then, model-based evidence for PM induced attentional lapsing has only been found in one experiment out of eight (Heathcote et al., 2015; Horn & Bayen, 2015) . This suggests that, in the modeled ongoing tasks, the burden of PM on executive capacity has been fairly limited. This is ostensibly inconsistent with previous studies indicating that taxing the executive control system can produce PM decrements (e.g., Marsh & Hicks, 1998) , and studies showing that working memory is correlated with PM accuracy (e.g., Smith & Bayen, 2005) . We can think of two reasons for this apparent contradiction. First, although it is often assumed that capacitysharing processes are common to both PM target trials and nontarget trials, they may not be. For example, executive capacity may only be required to perform the PM retrieval process when triggered by the PM target, or to coordinate the PM response procedure. To date we do not know of a study that can disentangle the executive requirements of nontarget trials from the executive requirements of PM target trials. Our analysis included only PM costs to nontarget trials, whereas previous analyses of working memory and PM accuracy did not include a parallel analysis of PM costs. Second, it is possible that executive capacity affects the PM related processes that occur on nontarget trials without being significantly strained by those processes. For example, executive capacity may be used to adjust thresholds to meet PM task demands. In this case, individuals with lower executive capacity (e.g., lower working memory span, imposed working memory load) may fail to increase their thresholds in PM blocks, or fail to increase their thresholds selectively when PM instructions are stimulus-specific. If executive capacity tends only to be engaged to modify thresholds when executive capacity is available, this could explain why PM tasks appear not to induce attentional lapses, which would require overloading the executive system. We found that nonfocal PM costs were driven by increased response thresholds. This supports the delay theory of PM costs, which proposes that PM costs reflect a strategy of waiting for potential PM retrieval. The best fitting model (LBA) suggested that both the word and nonword thresholds increased. This is consistent with the proposition by Horn and Bayen (2015) that PM instructions can cause a more generally cautious approach because of an increase in perceived task complexity. In contrast to the predictions of Horn and Bayen's complexity account, we also observed that our nonfocal threshold increases were higher for the word response. This selective shift suggests that threshold increases may be targeted particularly at modifying the response selection on PM trials. As word accumulation is the most competitive with PM response selection (because PM items are also words), this threshold increase would be responsible for the majority of the delay on PM trials. However, note that the BIC selected LBA did not include a selective shift for word responding (for either PM condition). We reported the AIC model, because the model was no worse in fit than the top model, whereas the BIC model was statistically inferior in fit to the top model. One weakness of the AIC model is that it overpredicted error rates to word trials in nonfocal blocks, whereas the BIC model did not. This could have occurred because the AIC model included a stronger bias against word responding than was actually present in the data.
Focal PM costs were also entirely threshold driven, supporting the delay theory, but they differed in two regards from the nonfocal PM costs. First, in the focal blocks, the word threshold increased but the nonword threshold did not. This suggests that focal PM instructions did not increase the overall perception of task complexity. This result contrasts with the previous model of focal PM costs presented by Horn and Bayen (2015) , in which both thresholds increased. However, their focal PM task was more complex than ours. Our task used a single-target focal PM requirement, whereas Horn and Bayen required participants to respond to any word from a previously encoded three-item list. Perhaps the higher retrospective memory load of the Horn and Bayen focal PM task caused an increase in perceived task complexity.
A higher retrospective memory load might also have contributed to the larger caution increase in our nonfocal condition compared with the focal condition. In the single target focal task each PM cue is identical to the target and reinforces its representation in memory directly. This is not the case for our nonfocal cues where there is an indirect activation of the category node by the cue. Note that both increases in threshold because of retrospective memory load and increases because of task complexity are not a priori features of delay theory. Thus, it seems that, although the selective delay of ongoing task responses to enable PM responses does occur, it occurs in the context of a wider range of PM task-related processes.
The second difference between the focal model and nonfocal models is that the word threshold increases were smaller overall in the focal case. Assuming that focal PM retrieval is faster than nonfocal retrieval, this would follow from the delay theory. A faster focal PM retrieval means that less response delay is required for the PM response to out-race the word response. This faster PM retrieval may owe to the activation of spontaneous retrieval processes, as specified in the Multiprocess view (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) .
To the extent that threshold increases were not selective to word thresholds, they cannot be attributed purely to delay theory. Although group model selection favored a selective threshold increase in both nonfocal and focal conditions, an examination of individual differences (see supplementary materials) suggests that the pattern did not hold for all participants. About half of our participants disproportionately increased their word threshold in nonfocal conditions, but the remainder raised both thresholds equally. This heterogeneity in the extent of selective versus general threshold increases may have driven the aforementioned miss-fit of the AIC model to nonfocal word accuracy. Perhaps the benefit of the selective delay strategy is not immediately obvious to participants, either because the stimulusspecific nature of the PM task was not salient at encoding time, or because consideration was not given to the underlying dynamics of decision-making that would occur on PM trials. Such a difference might explain why some studies find stimulus-specific instructions cause selective costs and other studies find costs to both word and nonword trial types (e.g., Cohen, Jaudas, Hirschhorn, Sobin, & Gollwitzer, 2012; Horn & Bayen, 2015) .
If the selective delay strategy is indeed optimal, then extended experience with the PM task might encourage it. Consistent with this possibility, we observed that the bias against word responses increased over the days of the experiment. Although the same trend was observed in the control condition, where the word response does not compete with a PM response, this could be caused by within-subjects carryover effects (Poulton, 1982 ) from the PM blocks. As there were two PM blocks (focal and nonfocal) for each control block, the PM delay strategy might persist into control blocks.
There were no changes in nondecision time across conditions with the LBA. However, the DDM accounted for a sizable portion This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
of costs with increased nondecision time: nondecision time was equal in size to the entirety of focal PM costs (0.010 s), and about half of nonfocal PM costs (0.022 s). One interpretation of this effect is that it reflects capacity-sharing between a PM process and stimulus encoding and/or response production processing. Another interpretation of the effect is that it reflects a sequential target check. That is, detection of the PM cue could require capacitydemanding operations that occur after response selection on the lexical-decision task but before response execution. Consequently, if the nondecision time account of our costs is accepted then our conclusions are confined to the issue of shared capacity during processing. There is also the strong possibility that the nondecision time increases are an artifact of the particular assumptions of the DDM. This interpretation is supported by the superior fit of the LBA, and previous findings that in simulations LBA threshold increases can cause increases in both threshold and nondecision time in the DDM . During the review process some concerns were raised over the fact that our PM instruction told participants to make the PM response instead of the word response. This instruction is similar to the more common instruction used in the PM literature for participants to make the PM response when the target is presented (e.g., Scullin et al., 2010; Smith & Bayen, 2004 ). An alternative type of instruction is to explicitly tell the participant to make the ongoing task response before the PM response Loft et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2005) . The latter instruction might allow participants to remember to make their PM response after they make their ongoing task decision, rendering threshold increases less useful for PM. However, Heathcote et al. (2015) found a similar pattern of results to the current study when they modeled a task with the instruction to make the ongoing task response before the PM response: selective threshold increases accounted for PM cost. These threshold increases may reduce PM errors because terminating stimulus processing to make an ongoing task response interrupts processing of the stimulus features required to detect the PM target (after the ongoing task response is made, the stimulus is removed from the display).
In summary, PM costs induced by both a single-target focal PM task and a categorical nonfocal task were driven by changes in response thresholds, rather than mean drift rates, supporting the delay theory of PM costs over capacity-sharing theories. Both the word and nonword thresholds increased in our nonfocal PM condition, but the increase in the word threshold was larger. This selective threshold increase in favor of PM responding supports the delay theory, which states that thresholds increase to allow time for the detection of the PM target. However, threshold increases were not entirely selective to the word accumulator for the nonfocal PM task, and this suggests the involvement of additional mechanisms that are not included in delay theory. It cannot be ascertained from the current data what those mechanisms are, but possibilities include increases in the perceived task complexity of the PM instructions, and increases retrospective memory load. In contrast, our AIC selected model suggests that under focal conditions, selective word threshold increases accounted for the entirety of PM costs. Finally, we found no evidence of a change in drift rate variability that would signify that the PM demand negatively impacted executive capacity.
